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With a brand new fire set ablaze by a serendipitous convergence of events ranging from a 
science fiction novel and movie (“The Martian”), to ground-breaking recent discoveries of 
flowing water on its surface, the drive for the journey to Mars seems to be in a higher gear 
than ever before.  We are developing new spacecraft and support systems to take humans to 
the Red Planet, while scientists on Earth continue using the International Space Station as a 
laboratory to evaluate the effects of long duration space flight on the human body.  Written 
from the perspective of a facility test director rather than a researcher, and using past and 
current life support systems tests as examples, this paper seeks to provide an overview on 
how facility teams approach testing, the kind of information they need to ensure efficient 
collaborations and successful tests, and how, together with researchers and principal 
investigators, we can collectively apply what we learn to execute future tests.   
Nomenclature 
< = Less than 
APIST = Ambient Pressure Integrated Suit Test 
ARS = Air Revitalization System 
CAMRAS = Carbon Dioxide and Moisture Removal Amine Swingbed 
CEO = Chief Executive Officer 
CH4 = Methane 
CHC = Carbon Dioxide and Humidity Control Swingbed 
CHX = Condensing Heat Exchanger 
CO2 = Carbon Dioxide  
COO = Chief Operating Officer 
CTSD = Crew and Thermal Systems Division 
ECLSS = Environmental Control and Life Support System 
Ft/ft = Foot (unit of measure) 
HCTD = Human Certified Test Director 
HESTIA = Human Exploration Spacecraft Testbed for Integration and Advancement 
HMS = Human Metabolic Simulator 
iPAS = Integrated Power, Avionics and Software 
IPIST = Interim Pressure Integrated Suit Test 
ISRU  = In Situ Resource Utilization 
ISS = International Space Station 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
kPa = Kilopascal 
m = Meter 
O2 = Oxygen 
Pa = Pascal 
PI = Principal Investigator 
PIST = Pressure Integrated Suit Test 
                                                          
1 Test Director, NASA Johnson Space Center – Crew and Thermal Systems Division; 2101 NASA Parkway, Mail 
Code: EC4, Houston, Texas 77058 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160006072 2019-08-31T02:53:33+00:00Z
 
International Conference on Environmental Systems 
 
 
2
PM = Project Manager 
psia = Pounds per square inch absolute 
RP-LiOH = Reactive Plastic Lithium Hydroxide 
TCRS = Trace Contaminant Removal System 
TBD = To Be Determined 
TD = Test Director 
UPIST = Unmanned Pressure Integrated Suit Test 
VPIST = Vacuum Pressure Integrated Suit Test 
WBS = Work Breakdown Structure 
 
 
I. Introduction 
O the untrained eye, it may look like this all began yesterday, but the truth is that we have been going to Mars for 
a while.  The journey that development hardware takes before its final incarnation in a fully integrated spacecraft 
can take years – sometimes decades or more – as is the case for the Orion environmental control and life support 
system (ECLSS) that has been in development for the better part of a decade.   
Life support systems are not just for when everything goes according to plan.  What happens when things go 
wrong?  Through the Pressure Integrated Suit Test (PIST) series, NASA personnel at the Johnson Space Center have 
been characterizing the behavior of a closed loop system for life support in the event of cabin depressurization, with 
test subjects wearing developmental space suits.  This is a very exciting time, as we are now faced with many 
“firsts” – testing hardware and people in ways that have not been tested before  This must be how the Apollo era 
engineers and scientists felt.  Not since then have there been so many “firsts” in the area of human in the loop 
vacuum testing.  This kind of crewed testing – one of the most hazardous activities we perform on the ground at JSC 
– requires an iterative approach, as each new iteration increases in complexity (and often, hazards). One does not 
simply trust an uncertified life support system to keep test subjects alive in a vacuum chamber, while donning a 
modified space suit used in a way it was not initially designed to operate.  Steps were taken to characterize the 
system, protocols were written, hazards were mitigated, and lessons were learned.  The PIST series, conducted in the 
Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) 11-Ft chamber, started with unmanned test precursors before moving 
to a human-in-the-loop phase, and continues to evolve with the eventual goal of a qualification test for the final 
system that will be installed on Orion. 
Much “younger”, but in many ways related, is the fledgling Human Exploration Spacecraft Testbed for 
Integration and Advancement (HESTIA) program: an effort led by the JSC Engineering Directorate to research and 
develop technologies that will eventually work in concert to support habitation on an extraterrestrial planet, such as 
Mars.  September 2015 marked the first unmanned HESTIA chamber test, which integrated three proven 
technologies into the CTSD 20-Ft chamber simulating a habitat, with the goal of characterizing how each affected 
the other in a closed environment.  Like PIST, HESTIA will eventually culminate in crewed testing, but it is 
important to approach this effort rigorously.  Unlike PIST, HESTIA can benefit from the lessons learned from a 
modern-era large scale crewed test that is farther ahead in its development and operational life cycle.  PIST will help 
us get to Mars.  HESTIA will help us live there.  Both test series are now ongoing.   
Human-in-the-loop testing is a very high-stake undertaking.  CTSD has developed checklists, guidelines and and 
overall approach overtime to ensure successful tests.  When processes are not followed or are modified, problems 
may arise down the line.  Let’s take a look at the two test activities chosen for this paper, and discuss what we have 
learned from them to make future tests even smoother. 
 
This is a tale of two chambers. 
T
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II. The Setting - Chambers 
A. 11-Ft Chamber  
The 11-Ft chamber (Figure 1) is a 11.0 ft x 19 ft (3.3 x 5.8 m), dual airlock pressure vessel used for human 
testing at reduced pressure, and space suit development and certification at vacuum.  It features a treadmill and a 
weight relief system for suited operations.  The outer lock of the chamber is home to the Dual Glove Box/2-Ft 
chamber complex, a thermal vacuum chamber used for extravehicular activity tool development and verification.  
The 11-Ft chamber was selected to house the PIST for a number of reasons:  its ability to be depressurized to 
vacuum, the existing test infrastructure to support a hazardous human-in-the-loop test, and its approximate volume 
to that of the Orion capsule for the cabin-mode tests where that is a desired variable. 
 
B. 20-Ft Chamber 
The 20-Ft chamber (Figure 2) is a large, three-level 
vacuum chamber that has been used over the years for a 
number of crewed habitability tests.  It has served as a sea-
level test bed for Space Station and advanced environmental 
control and life support systems testing.  This chamber was 
chosen for HESTIA due to its size, ability to accommodate 
people and hardware and, for future iterations of this test, its 
ability to be depressurized. 
III. The Storylines – Tests 
While extremely different in scope and technologies used, 
and at very different points in their life cycle, both PIST and 
HESTIA have many commonalities: both are large-scale tests 
utilizing development hardware, both are multi-year 
iterational test series, and they both require (or in HESTIA’s 
case, will require) human test subjects for the more realistic 
scenarios.   
The actual data analysis and test results are outside the 
scope of this paper, which aims at capturing the processes 
and pointing out lessons learned from a facility test 
standpoint.  However, shortenened overviews of the tests are 
discussed in the following sections, for better awareness. 
    
Figure 1.  11-Ft Chamber.  Inner Lock (L) and Outer Lock (R) 
 
 
Figure 2. 20-Ft Chamber 
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A. PIST Background and Overview 
The Orion Program baselined the Carbon Dioxide and Moisture Removal Amine Swing-bed (CAMRAS) as the 
technology for atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) and humidity removal for the Environmental Control and Life 
Support System.  In August 2006, personnel at the NASA Johnson Space Center Crew and Thermal Systems 
Division began testing CAMRAS units through a number of tests under different metabolic loads and cabin pressure 
environments. Following these initial tests, the PIST test series began in 2011 with the Ambient Pressure Integrated 
Suit Test (APIST) manned test, followed by the Intermediate Pressure Integrated Suit Test (IPIST), and the 
Unmanned Pressurized Integrated Suit Test (UPIST).  APIST was conducted to evaluate the performance of the 
CAMRAS when humans were introduced in the loop by incorporating up to two test subjects wearing pressure suits.    
IPIST tested the CAMRAS with human test subjects in pressure suits at sea level and 10.2 psia (70.3 kPa) cabin 
pressure and varying suit pressures.  The series progressed with UPIST, which tested the CAMRAS with unmanned 
suits at full vacuum.  VPIST (Figure 3) then merged the lessons learned in the prior tests series, and conducted 
manned testing at vacuum cabin pressure (300 microns/40 Pa or lower).  While at vacuum pressure, the test 
evaluated the new development Carbon Dioxide and Humidity Control (CHC) swingbed (in place of the older 
CAMRAS unit), and new Orion hardware, such as a development fan to circulate breathing gas, a development 
regulator to supply oxygen as needed to make up for pressure decreases and leaks, a development heat exchanger, 
and the current closed-loop suit design.  A new iteration on VPIST, planned for late 2016, will test the system with 
more advanced flight-like hardware, and four test subjects in suits at vacuum cabin pressure.  The benefit of VPIST 
being ahead of the Orion ECLSS design is the opportunity to recommend design changes based on test results. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  VPIST Test Setup in 11-Ft Chamber Inner Lock 
B. HESTIA Background and Overview 
We have a need to advance the capabilities that will support long-duration human exploration missions beyond 
low earth orbit. NASA has supported short duration (< two weeks) human space missions since 1961. The 
International Space Station (ISS) has been in continuous operations with crew aboard since 1998, with a regular 
resupply of consumables and maintenance items. For ISS, in the event of a catastrophic condition on-board the 
spacecraft, there is always an emergency option for crew to evacuate back to earth within hours. For longer missions 
beyond earth orbit, the human exploration spacecraft architecture must ensure crew survival for hundreds of days, 
and emergency resupply and a quick return to earth are not viable contingency options. These long duration 
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missions will be enabled by both the advancement of key technologies and an efficient approach to system design, in 
order to reduce mass, provide capability with margin, make efficient use of consumables, and have a balanced 
approach to reliability and spares. 
The management of a life support system for a long duration is one of the most complex challenges for human 
exploration missions. Recycling and reuse of consumables is required for a viable mission, and the very presence of 
humans in the loop makes the process much harder. Humans and the spacecraft generate waste and contaminants, 
which can be hard to fully characterize in advance. It is also difficult to predict the impact of contaminants on 
system components.  
 Current Mars architectures include the use of liquid oxygen (O2) and liquid methane (CH4) for spacecraft 
propulsion; this is due primarily to the commonality between oxygen and other spacecraft systems like life support, 
and the potential for making methane on the Mars surface using In Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) for the return 
vehicle. A system architecture that exploits these commonalities sounds great in theory, but key integration issues 
have not yet been examined to evaluate consumption and production rates, purity of commodities, and interplay 
between components.  
The goal of the HESTIA program is to provide the means for NASA engineers to develop, integrate, 
demonstrate, and test capabilities that are needed for long duration human exploration missions.   An initial ECLSS 
portion of HESTIA is what was evaluated in the 20-Ft chamber in 2015.  
The objective of this 
first “Phase I” test 
(diagram on Figure 4) was 
to evaluate a number of 
technologies which could 
one day be part of a closed 
loop habitat.  Test buildup 
and instrumentation were 
located on all of the three 
levels of the chamber, as 
well as the ground level 
and platform outside the 
vessel.  These initial 
technologies are described 
below.  The Electrolyzer 
splits water molecules into 
molecular oxygen and 
hydrogen.  Oxygen is 
injected into the chamber 
(for breathing for the crew 
in a future manned 
scenario).  At the time of 
the Phase I test, hydrogen 
was vented outside the 
building through a roof vent.  In future iterations of HESTIA testing, hydrogen may be used as an input to another 
life support system or ISRU technology.  
The Air Revitalization System (ARS) is a collection of different subsystems aimed at maintaining “good quality” 
air that the crew can breathe.  A fan circulates the air, while a condensing heat exchanger (CHX) pulls humidity out 
of the air.  Parallel flow paths then include a Trace Contaminant Removal System (TCRS), consisting of two trace 
contaminant filters used in in the VPIST test, and a Reactive Plastic Lithium Hydroxide (RP-LiOH) unit, which 
removes carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Since this first phase of testing was unmanned, a Human Metabolic Simulator (HMS) was used to simulate the 
human production of CO2 and humidity, and the removal of oxygen. 
As another proof of concept, select data from this test was sent to the Integrated Power, Avionics and Software 
(iPAS) laboratory in a remote location, with the idea of integrating data from different facilities in the future, for 
integration and modeling purposes. 
Figure 4.  HESTIA Phase I Integrated Schematic. 
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IV. The Plot Elements - The Ideal Test Process 
In order to allow a facility test team to perform at its best and have as much time and resources as possible 
dedicated to tackling the technological challenges that a test presents, there needs to be a strong foundation, both in 
terms of the information needed to get started, and a clear organizational set-up with defined roles.  It is in these two 
areas that we will look at our two chosen tests, to identify improvement areas.  First, however, it is important to 
delineate the elements of an ideal test process. 
Based on experience and lessons learned over literally decades of testing, there is a generally accepted approach to 
human-in-the-loop testing of life support systems in altitude chambers.  This approach spans from a defined 
organizational structure, specific information, and a structured process.  This is to ensure not only success of the 
project and test, but also safety of the test subjects.   
A. The “Smart Start” – The Backdrop 
When a Principal Investigator (PI) 
decides to perform a test, a number of 
basic items of information must be 
obtained by the test team.  Creation, 
design and execution of a test are the 
direct result of the collection of a 
number of key elements that are 
coordinated, managed and distilled 
successfully into a test.  As shown on 
Figure 5, these key elements are: 
1. Vision – what is the ultimate goal 
for the test or tests?  It is 
important to have a clear vision 
for the ultimate purpose of a 
project or test to be able to map 
out a strategy to arrive at it, which 
in some cases, may result in a 
change of scope or breakdown 
into phases. 
2. Plan – taking the vision to a more 
concrete level, what does the PI 
plan on testing, and how?  What 
hardware/software/operation is 
being tested?  What values and 
variables will need to be 
monitored, and recorded?  Quite 
simply put, when the test team 
arrives on test day, what will they 
be doing?   
3. Requirements – breaking down the plan to quantitative details results in requirements.  These are the 
quintessential “shall” statements that dictate what the test team will be required to meet in order to build the test 
apparatus and execute the test procedures as required by the PI. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Key Elements for a Test.  These elements represent the 
foundation of required information for a successful test, or “Smart 
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B.  Organizational Structure of a Test Team – The Cast 
Once the Smart Start elements are defined, and a PI reaches out to a testing organization such as CTSD’s 
Systems Test Branch, a test team is assembled.  At the inception of a test of any size, a test director (TD) with a test 
team are assigned to the task.  The test director may also act as the project manager (PM) or, depending on the 
activity’s scope, be flanked by a full-time PM to allow him/her more time to focus on integration and operations.  
The PM also facilitates the 
collection and redaction of 
the information from the 
Smart Start elements and 
organizes it (see Figure 6).  
This is especially crucial in 
the case of a test with 
multiple PI’s and multiple 
sets of requirements.  As with 
any project (and it is 
important to emphasize that a 
test is a project and should be 
run as such), communication 
is extremely important.  
However, it is also important 
to follow the hierarchical 
structure for actions such as 
performance of work, 
requirements vetting and 
approval, and scope, budget 
and schedule management.  
In the case of distinct PM and 
TD roles, it is important that 
both roles are well 
demarcated and operate over 
their respective 
juridisdictions with authority, 
much in the way that a 
company’s CEO and COO 
would. 
C. The Iterative Test Process – The Script 
Helped by a solid Smart Start, the first task of a TD and Test Team is to gather information on the vision, plan 
and requirements from the principal investigator(s) and distill those into test products (see Figure 7).  These products 
are: 
 Work breakdown structure (WBS) 
 Schedule 
 Cost estimate 
 Design 
 Buildup 
 Test procedure and documentation (which includes design reviews, protocols, hazard analyses, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Organizational Structure of a Test Team.  Communication is key 
in every project: the graphic illustrates the communications channels with the 
dashed line, according to the N(N-1)/2 formula1.  However, the organizational 
hierarchy (marked with the large solid arrows) must be followed for proper 
management of the project. 
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The direct elements correlation illustrated on Figure 7 indicates that the quality of the output is only as good or 
comprehensive as the quality and comprehensiveness of the input.  Lack of requirements directly reduces the fidelity 
of a cost estimate, and affects the ability to create an accurate design and test procedure.  An unfocused vision and 
plan directly affect many of the procedures and protocols, if the test team does not have a clear idea of the end goal 
or the daily operations needed to achieve it.  As represented on the diagram, this is an iterative process and may 
require a number of iterations, particularly for complex tests.  Any of the test team’s products, especially the earlier 
ones such as WBS, schedule, and estimate, may indicate the need for the entire team to revise requirements, plans, 
and even the vision. On the latter in particular, a need may become apparent for a re-scoping, or de-scoping based on 
factors such as cost, schedule, and feasibility. 
It should be apparent by now that the better delineated and solid the initial three key elements are, the higher the 
chances for a successful test.  A lack of requirements immediately affects a test design and test procedure.   
With this framework in place, we can now look at how certain aspects worked well under PIST and HESTIA, 
and how others could use improvement. 
V. The Cautionary Tales 
A. PIST – A Story About (Mostly) Smart Starts 
1. Smart Starts 
If there is one key element that PIST had locked in from the start, it was vision: the ultimate vision for PIST was 
always to test developmental ECLSS hardware with humans in a vacuum to provide input to the final Orion design.  
From the onset, the PIST team took the incremental approach (Figure 8) that its predecessor test series, CAMRAS, 
employed successfully.  Because of the quantity of developmental hardware involved in the use of a new life support 
system with humans in the loop, it was decided early on to split the test into large stand-alone tests, and be able to 
characterize the hardware in a manned environment before adding hazards such as reduced pressure and, eventually 
full vacuum.   
 
Figure 7 - Distillation of Smart Start Elements by the Test Team.  This graphic highlights the direct 
correlation of inputs (vision, requirements, plans) to test products and the iterative process that occurs in the 
development phase. 
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Figure 8. VPIST Iterative Approach. 
 
In true iterative fashion, vision scoping and planning processes continued through the lifecycle: although smaller 
in scale than its counterparts, UPIST did not initially exist as a stand-alone test activity.  However, with the data 
gathered from APIST and IPIST, the team decided to add one more step before the human-in-the-loop vacuum test.  
This breakdown approach also helped reduce initially daunting undertakings into more manageable ones.  One 
particular example is the writing and submittal of the human testing protocol to the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), prior to subjecting any human subjects to any potentially hazardous condition.  A new protocol was written 
and submitted for each PIST manned test series, eventually culminating into VPIST.  By that point, a lot of the 
knowledge base was already in place, familiarity with the IRB process had been acquired, and the team was aware 
of the documentation required to satisfy the IRB’s questions and concerns, rendering the process increasingly 
smooth, despite the increasingly complicated test. 
While vision was almost laser focused from the beginning, requirements and planning were not quite as defined; 
the first of the PIST tests, APIST, had a rather fast-paced development process, and the TD acted as the project 
manager.  Because of its fast cycle, the test plan and requirements document were not fully developed prior to the 
test procedure, but rather almost concurrently.  This caused difficulties with ironing out a final design and 
accompanying procedures.  As a major lesson learned from APIST, the inefficiency of this approach was improved 
for further tests, particularly with VPIST, where a draft test plan and requirements documents were circulated and 
eventually completed before test procedures were written.  Figure 9 graphically illustrates the different outcomes 
from APIST to its successors.  As an additional example of how important this distillation process is and its effect 
on the test, even the few “to-be-determined” areas left in the VPIST requirements document eventually caused a few 
design/redesign issues, which affected both cost and schedule. 
 
    
            
Figure 9. Smart Start Elements in the PIST Series.  From APIST (left) to its successors (right), a better definition 
of the key elements resulted in higher quality deliverables from the test team.  It is important to note, however, that  
while this graphic focuses on a number of fundamental elements, complex tests may have been affected by technical 
challenges as well. 
 
2. Organizational Growth 
Organizationally, as the complexity of the test grew, starting with VPIST, the TD was flanked by a dedicated 
PM, with the direct mandate to collect the PI’s requirements and manage schedule for deliverables to the TD, track 
and manage budget, manage stakeholders, and act as liaison between the requesting groups and the facility team.  
This allowed the TD and the rest of the test team to focus on the hardware and software integration, engineer and 
technician leadership and management, test design buildup, and operations. 
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3. Moral of the Story 
Large, multi-phased tests are going to increase in complexity and hazards.  It is important to have a clear vision 
of the endgame, and break down the endeavor into manageable pieces with a reasonable scope.  It is also important 
to re-evaluate the scope, as was the case for UPIST, in case further reassessment is needed.  Concurrently, it is just 
as important to have a clear plan and requirements to enable a testing organization to assess feasibility, cost, and 
schedule and avoid rework due solely to lack of information.  In terms of the Smart Start elements, the PIST series 
has become smarter and smarter with each iteration, rendering the realization of the vision and implementation of 
the plan smoother with each test, despite the rising challenges. 
Organizationally, the addition of a PM as the test grew helped alleviate the burden on the TD, and also provided 
a point of contact between the PIs and the testing organization, with the TD still acting as a “gate keeper” to the test 
team. 
B. HESTIA – A Story About  A Missing Cast Member 
HESTIA’s vision was rather well defined from the start – integrating existing and emerging technologies to 
create a closed loop habitat for human habitation and running a human-in-the-loop evaluation.   
 
 
Figure 10. HESTIA Initial Vision Breakdown.  While the “TBD technologies” may be what jumps out the most, 
the hidden risk here is actually the first phase that jumps into a manned test with untested technologies in this 
scenario.   
 
A large number of PIs came to HESTIA with their respective technologies, making the first challenge deciding 
which of these technologies would be feasible to integrate into the chamber for a first test, within the budget and 
scheduled allotted.  While that was definitely an issue to resolve, the hidden risk lay in the initial dermarcation of the 
various phases, which was delineated as shown 
on Figure 10.  While a non test director PM 
was assigned to the test, there was initially no 
human-certified TD (HCTD) with the 
knowledge of risks and protocols for this type 
of testing.  The lack of a human testing subject 
matter expert resulted in the PIs 
communicating requirements, operational 
information, desires and other type of 
information directly to the test team engineers 
(Figure 11). 
What would normally be considered 
communications channels, became conduits for 
establishing requirements, and directing work, 
without the PM necessarily being in the loop.  
Also lacking was a focal point to educate and 
extract the Smart Start elements of vision, plan, 
and requirements into deliverables.  In essence, 
the distillation process described on illustration 
Figure 7 was not occurring as necessary.  
Requirements were being captured but not in 
an integrated fashion: the big picture of how 
these systems were going to work together was 
missing, resulting in a lack of a test plan 
describing the goals of the test operations as a 
whole, and the absence of a discrete test matrix 
outlining test points and configurations.   
Figure 11. Organizational Structure Without a TD.  The 
lack of a test director caused some of the communication lines 
to “solidify” into organizational lines, making the project 
hard to manage by a sole PM. 
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This situation presented itself shortly after VPIST was concluded, so some of the key personnel from that test 
became available and were assigned to HESTIA.  The first organizational change was to restore structure to match 
the optimal test team structure (see Figure 6).  This restored the communication and organizational lines and 
jumpstarted the distillation process.  Based on the desired phased approach to achieve the vision, the TD and test 
team returned a WBS, cost estimate and schedule that far exceeded the initial expectations.  A rescope was clearly 
needed.  Taking a page out of UPIST, a further phase breakdown occurred, which allowed the team to tackle a more 
manageable task within a reasonable timeframe and budget (Figure 12).  A major change was to keep the first 
newly-formulated phase of HESTIA unmanned, to first evaluate these technologies without the added variable of a 
human in the loop. 
 
 
Figure 12. New Breakdown of HESTIA Phases. 
 
With a new approach and a functional team in place, the HESTIA team restarted a requirements aggregation 
process and assisted the PIs in formulating a test plan which, with the assistance of the PM, included a clear test 
matrix that allowed the test team to create a concept of operations and produce appropriate test procedures.   
A perfect example that reaffirms the need for a designated person to aggregate and distill plan and requirements 
was the creation of the test point matrix.  One of the systems had a requirement to keep the chamber door closed for 
the first few days of testing to achieve a high CO2 level without reconditioning the chamber each day.  Meanwhile, 
another system had a requirement to access the chamber at the end of each day to retrieve and measure the amount 
of condensated water from the air.  This kind of conflict would normally be identified early on when creating a test 
plan and comprehensive matrix.  In the case of HESTIA, this conflict was identified by the TD (who was not in the 
original team make-up) rather late in the process, during the test procedure creation.  Fortunately, in this particular 
case, this conflict required a fairly easy solution.  However, it is a valid example of an issue that could have been 
caught and resolved much earlier in the process. 
The team went on to complete the HESTIA Phase I test successfully and within the budget and schedule 
generated during the restored distillation process.  The follow-up phase, consisting mostly of chamber upgrades to 
support future tests, is underway at the writing of this paper.   
 
1. Moral of the Story 
The idea behind HESTIA is no-doubt cutting edge: using existing and emerging technologies to create highly 
integrated and interdependent systems to support missions to other planets.  In the life support and in-situ resource 
utilization arenas, this means utilizing the same fluids and raw materials, as well as byproducts to provide the 
functions needed.  In and of itself, this is an extremely ambitious, long term goal.  In addition, HESTIA initially 
employed a new methodology for collecting and cataloguing requirements in an online Sharepoint-based repository, 
in an attempt to eliminate traditional plan and requirements documents, which was a rather large paradigm shift.  
Combined, the broad vision and the new approach resulted in a very large undertaking. 
As in any project, it is important to start by setting up the proper organizational structure, with clear roles to 
encourage communication and efficiently manage work assignments and stakeholders relationships.  While creating 
a more streamlined team, the initial absence of a HCTD during the requirements collection proved to be a detriment 
by not infusing the team early on with the necessary expertise, the ability to integrate the requirements and create a 
holistic view of the test, and easily identify any “holes” in the information provided.  While the Sharepoint site 
provided a place to collect the requirements, it did not integrate them and interpret them into a solid idea of what a 
test would look like, therefore it was not a replacement for a person with the right skill set.  Furthermore, a different 
breakdown of the vision, as was done post-reorganization, would have likely occurred earlier had there been a fully 
staffed team in place that included a HCTD. 
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VI. Epilogue 
Conceiving, structuring, managing, and executing a test is like telling a story or writing a book (or a multi-part 
saga).  Whether it turns out to be a fairy tale or a horror story depends on many factors, but for it to be compelling 
there are certain elements that need to be in place. 
There need to be solid plot elements, starting with the foundations of the elements of vision, planning and 
requirements.  A Smart Start.  There needs to be a complete cast of characters (preferably, no villains) that include 
not only the PIs, but also the managers and leaders (PM and/or TD) with the appropriate background and 
experience, as well as the test team.  There needs to be an efficient and comprehensive distillation process of the 
Smart Start elements by the team to create efficient and complete test products; the weaker any one element is, the 
weaker the rest of the story.   
All these elements result in what the Crew and Thermal Systems Division at NASA JSC considers the basic 
tenets of out human-in-the-loop accepted test process.  These tenets are virtually non-negotiable.  Reductions or 
shortcuts have a history of causing issues. 
  Ironically, VPIST added a PM in its later iterations to tackle increased complexity, whereas HESTIA started 
without a human-certified TD, and then added one.  In both cases, the teams had the courage to reassess and make 
changes which immediately resumed the Smart Start distillation process and resulted in better functioning teams and 
successful tests.  While HESTIA certainly learned from VPIST by immediately adopting the phase approach, it 
attempted this breakdown exercise without all stakeholders on the team to point out any weaknesses or issues.    
Both tests showcased in this manuscript showed that an issue with any of the these elements resulted in one or 
more problems downstream that required revisiting, often at the cost of budget, schedule, and/or technical 
objectives. 
Although two test cases were used from two neighboring chamber tests, the lessons learned from running large 
scale tests (manned or unmanned) can be applied to many similar operations of all sizes.  Usually, activities such as 
these have a large number of technological challenges and unknowns, which are enough for a team to focus on 
within the usual constraints of budget and schedule, so any work that can be done in the beginning to set a strong 
base, will help result in a smoother execution.  From a programmatic standpoint, the lessons learned from PIST and 
HESTIA can be summarized as follows: 
 Principal Investigators should strive to have as clear a vision as possible for the activity they want to test, 
coupled with clear requirements (the “what”) and a plan (the  “how”); the end result is highly dependent 
on the information provided in the beginning 
 Testing organizations should identify key team players and stakeholders early on; 
o At a minimum a test team should be composed of a TD (acting as the project manager) and the 
test team, composed of engineers and technicians as appropriate for the task 
o Based on complexity and scope, it may be advisable to split the leadership/management role 
by flanking the TD with a PM.  One can focus on the technical management and operations, 
while the other provides the outward interface to the PI’s and overall programmatic 
management. 
o TD qualifications are unique.  While it is possible for a TD to pull “double-duty” as PM, the 
opposite is not necessarily true due to the very specific training required to be a certified 
HCTD.  The TD should be present early on in any activity that is going to culminate into a test. 
 All processes should always be open to revision and improvement.  The test process is no different.  
However, major changes (such as the document-free Sharepoint approach) should be implemented 
carefully and incrementally, especially when there are other complexities at work.  Additionally, at a 
minimum they should provide the functions of the process they are replacing. 
The road to Mars is long and arduous.  Large-scale, multi-year test operations are the way to get there.  It is 
important to continue evaluating our processes, delineating key elements for smooth execution and ultimate success, 
and formalizing them within the technical community.  It is imperative for PIs to understand what test teams need, 
so that we may be, and continue to be, on the same page, as we write the next chapter in space exploration together. 
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